We analyze the performance of Japanese opentype stock mutual funds for the 1981-1992 period. The results show that, regardless of the performance measures and benchmarks employed, most of the Japanese mutual funds underperform the benchmarks by between 3.6% and 10.8% per annum. These funds tend to invest more in large stocks with low book-to-market ratios. But this feature does not explain the underperformance. A potential explanation is the dilution effect caused by inflows of funds. In Japan, a new investor of an open-type fund only pays in the after-tax value of the net asset value. We conduct a bootstrap experiment to assess the magnitude of this dilution effect.
impressive compared to that of the market. 1 The average rate of return of 800 open-type mutual funds was 1.74% per annum between January 1981 and December 1992, while that of the market was 9.28% per annum during the same period. Regardless of the performance measures and benchmarks employed, we find strong evidence of underperformance in the Japanese mutual funds.
It has been suggested that the meager performance of Japanese mutual funds may be due to institutional factors such as the contracts between fund managers and their employers as well as the relationships between mutual fund companies and brokerage houses [see, for example, Economist (1994) ]. Major mutual fund companies are subsidiaries of the brokerage houses from which top management as well as many fund managers are drawn. The fund managers' salaries are paid from the fixed commissions that investors pay to the mutual fund companies. However, their salaries may not be directly linked to their investment performance. They are usually tied closely to the pay scale of the parent company, which may be unrelated to each manager's performance. Good performance of a manager may result to a certain extent in quicker promotions or higher bonuses, but the link is not as explicit as in the United States. Such a compensation scheme may create an agency problem between the fund managers and the investors. According to the Economist (1994), the turnover ratio in Japanese mutual funds was more than twice the Tokyo market average during the 1980s. A high turnover ratio produces profits for the parent brokerage houses due to the fixed commissions for stock trading. Finally, major brokerage houses like Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa, and Yamaichi recommend stocks for their clients. These recommendations may influence the selection of the stocks by the subsidiary mutual fund companies. The Japanese Ministry of Finance has been aware of the poor performance of mutual funds and has come up with several ways to bring more competition into the business as well as to disclose more information to investors. First, the ministry has permitted banks and foreign companies to manage mutual funds since 1990. Second, the ministry intends to promote comparisons of funds' performance so that investors can make informed choices. At present, mutual fund managers are not allowed to compare their performance with rivals' in advertisements. Finally, since June 1994, fund managers have to disclose their commissions.
We provide the first comprehensive study of Japanese mutual funds. Our sample covers the open-type stock mutual funds managed by nine investment management companies for the 1981-1992 period. We employ the traditional Jensen measure [Jensen (1968 [Jensen ( , 1969 ] as well as the positive period weighting measure developed by Titman (1989b, 1994) . Following Ferson and Schadt (1996) , we incorporate conditional information directly into the performance measures to control for the biases arising from fund managers responding to public information. Further we investigate what kind of strategy funds have followed in general. To this end we construct mimicking portfolios based on size and book-to-market ratios, and explore if any of the performance found in the previous section can be explained by the weighting on these factors.
In order to obtain valid inferences with various performance measures, the benchmark must be mean-variance efficient from the point of view of the uninformed investor. We employ two different benchmarks. The first one is a value-weighted single-index benchmark that covers stocks listed on both the first section and the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), government bonds, corporate bonds, and convertible bonds. The second benchmark consists of three factors: (1) the value-weighted market factor as described above; (2) a mimicking factor that is related to the size effect; and (3) another mimicking factor that is related to the book-to-market ratio. We find evidence that the three-factor benchmark is more appropriate than the single-index benchmark. However, our general conclusion is not affected by the choice of benchmark.
We also evaluate the dilution effect on the net asset value of opentype funds. This effect is caused by a particular method according to which the sales price of a mutual fund share is calculated when there is an inflow of funds. For an outflow, the fund pays out net asset value (NAV) to the investors so that the NAV per share is unaffected by the outflow. The investors pay capital gains tax, if any, from the proceeds. For an inflow, new investors do not pay in the amount equal to the NAV per share. Instead, new investors pay in the after-tax value of the NAV, which is the amount that existing investors would receive after tax if they sold their share. Therefore the NAV per share is diluted by the inflow. This implies that the rate of return on the NAV would be negative even if the return on the managed portfolio is zero.
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an introduction to Japanese mutual funds. Section 2 provides a comprehensive performance evaluation using various measures. This section also examines whether performance varies between different periods, whether any management company or companies performed better (or worse) than the others, and whether there is any persistence in performance among the managers. Section 3 analyzes how funds were managed and investigates their performance by using the mimicking portfolios based on size and book-to-market ratios. This section also refers briefly to funds' timing ability. Section 4 provides a simulation analysis of the dilution effect. The last section presents the conclusion.
Japanese Mutual Funds

Overview of the mutual fund industry
Japanese mutual funds are of the contractual type, not of the corporate type which prevails in the United States; thus the funds are called investment trusts. A contract is made between an investment trust management company, a trustee (a trust bank), and a beneficiary (an investor). The cash collected from investors by management companies through subscriptions or sales of beneficiary certificates is transferred to the custody of a trustee company. The manager gives investment instructions to the trustee that administers and safe-keeps the assets. 2 The administration fee of the trust bank is passed on to the investors as a debit subtracted from the NAV of the mutual fund (or investment trust). In addition and in most cases, an investor of an open-type mutual fund is required to pay a fee up front as a fixed percentage of the value of the investment. This fee is typically between 2% and 5% of the investment value, and is an investor's out-of-pocket cost that is not deducted from the fund's asset.
At present in Japan, there are 16 domestic, 5 foreign-affiliated, and 5 bank-affiliated investment trust management companies. 3 However, a major portion of the investment trusts sold in Japan has been run by management companies that are subsidiaries of Japanese brokerage houses. Many of these management companies originate from the investment trust division of the brokerage houses, which originally managed their own investments. The management company delegates subscriptions and sales of the investment trusts to brokerage houses; at present, the majority of funds are sold through brokerage houses that are parents of the fund management firms. A small portion of funds managed by foreign-or bank-affiliated companies is 2 As of May 1994, there were 11 trust companies and 1 commercial bank that were engaged in the trust function. 3 The Ministry of Finance licensed non-Japanese affiliated companies to operate mutual fund companies after October 1990, and licensed Japanese bank-affiliated companies to do the same after October 1993. As of May 1994 the 16 management companies affiliated with domestic brokerage houses include Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, Taiyo, Shin-Wako, Sanyo, Asahi, Japan, Daiichi, Kokusai, Cosmo, Tokyo, Universal, Taiheiyo, and Toyo; the bank-affiliated management companies include SBIM, Sakura, Sanwa, Nochu, and Fuji; and the foreign-affiliated management companies are Warburg, Jardine Fleming, Invesco, Schroder, and Credit Suisse.
sold by brokerage houses that are not affiliated with the management companies or are sold directly by the management firms. The sample we use includes only those funds that are sold by the parent brokerage houses, because most of the other types of funds did not begin operation before 1990. Depending on the portfolio structure, investment trusts in Japan can be classified into two kinds: stock investment trusts and bond investment trusts. The latter invest only in bonds and money market instruments. The former, however, invest not only in stocks but also in bonds (including convertible bonds and warrants) and the money market. According to the investment policy of the funds, stock investment trusts are broadly classified into three categories: growth type, stable growth type, and stable type. The growth type typically has no upper limit on the proportion that the fund can invest in stocks, whereas the stable growth type does have such limits. The stable type mainly invests in convertible bonds. 4 At the end of 1992, the portfolio weights of stocks, bonds, and other money market instruments in stock investment trusts were 50.2%, 17.6%, and 26.5%, respectively [see Investment Trusts Association (1994) ]. The investment trusts in Japan can be grouped into open type and unit type. The former allows additional flow of funds into the trust property after the fund's institution, while the latter does not. We focus on open-type investment trusts because unit-type funds operate for only about 5 years.
Investment trusts in Japan represented about 3.5% of the financial assets of the household sector as of the end of 1992 (Flow of Funds Account, The Bank of Japan). This figure includes both stock and bond investment trusts as well as both open-type and unit-type investment trusts. At the end of the same year, investment trusts had approximately 43 trillion yen in aggregate assets, of which 21 trillion was in stock investment trusts. The following numbers summarize the stockholdings of the funds during 1992. The total market value of stocks held by the funds was 10.1 trillion yen or 12.5 million shares, which amounts to 3.4% and 3.6%, respectively, of total stocks outstanding on all stock exchanges in Japan at the end of the year. The stocks traded by the funds during the year, the sum of buys and sells, amounted to 12.2 trillion yen or 13.9 million shares, which represented 15.1% in value and 16.8% in volume of the aggregate stock trading. Therefore, the turnover ratio of all funds was 110.7% while that of the market was 47.68% during the year.
Management fees and taxes
There are two sources of costs that are borne by investors (or beneficiaries) of the investment trust. The NAV of a fund is determined after deducting these costs from the asset value. The first cost component is a fixed management fee paid to the management company, the trust bank, and the brokerage house that subscribes and sells the investment trust security. The amount of the fee ranges from 0.55% to 1.5% of the total asset value, and the fee is deducted from the asset on a daily basis. The second component is the securities transfer tax plus the brokerage commission, which is paid to the brokerage house that executes orders from the management company. This part of the management fee varies according to the amount of turnover. The brokerage commission rates vary from 1.150% of transactions valued under 1 million yen to 0.100% of those above 500 million and below 1 billion yen. For transactions over 1 billion yen, the commission rates are negotiable. (The rates were amended on June 4, 1990.) The securities transfer tax on equity is 0.3% of the market price (since April 1992) and is paid by investors when they sell shares.
To provide an estimate of the transaction costs, we need estimates of both turnover rate and average transaction value. From the aggregate data, the annual turnover rate was approximately 110% for 1992. Since we do not have data on the average transaction value, we arbitrarily choose a range of commission rates that is plausible for institutional investors: From 0.375% for transactions valued from 30 million to 50 million yen for the lower range to 0.100% for those from 500 million to 1 billion yen for the higher range. Assuming a turnover rate of 110%, the variable portion of transaction cost ranges from approximately 0.72% to 1.32% per annum. These figures assume a securities transfer tax rate of 0.45%, a rate that had been imposed during most of our observation period.
5 If the fixed management fee is 0.55% (1.5%), the total transaction cost ranges from 1.27% (2.22%) to 1.87% (2.82%).
Mutual fund data
The mutual fund data are obtained from Kinyuu Deta Sisutemu (Financial Data Systems Incorporated) in Tokyo for the period from January 1978 -April 1994 isted during the period is included; thus there is no survivorship bias. Among the 26 companies, half of them started operation only after 1990. In particular, we choose nine management companies that operated throughout the observation period. These companies include Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, Taiyo, Shin-Wako, Sanyo, Asahi, and Japan. After adjusting the NAV for splits, if any, we calculate the continuously compounded monthly returns with dividend payments for all the funds. 6 For individual fund analysis, we select the funds with more than 97 observations from January 1981-December 1992. 7 We find 64 funds managed by the nine fund management companies. However, the requirement of at least 97 observations may bias the average return of these funds upward due to survivorship. Therefore, unbiased return results are likely to be worse than the results obtained in the paper from these funds. To assess the aggregate performance of Japanese mutual funds, we construct two portfolios, vw800 and ew800, which are the value-and equal-weighted portfolios, respectively, of all the 800 mutual funds run by the nine fund management companies. We also construct both value-and equal-weighted portfolios of the 64 individual funds, vw64 and ew64. Since some of these funds concentrate investment in certain industries, foreign equities, or convertible bonds, we construct additional portfolios of funds that primarily invest in well-diversified Japanese equities. We find 190 diversified equity funds among the universe of 800 funds, and 13 among the 64 funds with a relatively long history. Table 1 shows that the average raw returns of the open-type mutual funds during the entire observation period (January 1981-December 1992) were 1.73% and 2.41% per annum for vw800 and ew800, respectively. The well-diversified Japanese equity funds (i.e., the 190 and 13 portfolios) show lower mean returns and higher standard deviations than those of the 800 and 64 portfolios. The subperiod figures show that the well-diversified equity funds did particularly poorly in the bear market during the January 1990-December 1992 period. Comparing the mutual fund returns to various benchmarks, we find that the aver-age performance of Japanese mutual funds underperformed various measures, even after adding back a transaction cost of, say, 5%.
Basic performance
The first benchmark in the table is a value-weighted index that includes all stocks listed on the TSE, all government and corporate bonds with a longer than 1-year maturity, and convertible bonds.
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The index performed at 8.91% during the full observation period. Since Japanese stock-type mutual funds invest not only in stocks but also in bonds and convertible bonds, it is appropriate to compare fund performance with this benchmark. We use this benchmark as the market index in subsequent analyses. The buy-and-hold 30 portfolio includes the 30 largest stocks as of the end of 1980. Its return was the highest (14.85% for the whole observation period) although its standard deviation was also the largest. Table 2 provides summary statistics for individual funds as well as for the nine management firms. Note that the returns in Table 2 are reported in terms of monthly returns instead of annual returns. For each company, mean return and standard deviation are reported for equally weighted portfolios of all its funds and for its well-diversified Japanese equity funds. Except for three management firms (Nomura, Sanyo, and Asahi), well-diversified equity funds performed worse than the average of all funds. Among the 64 individual funds, performance varies from −0.74% per month (−8.87% per annum) to 0.94% per month (11.29% per annum), and standard deviation from 1.99% per month (6.89% per annum) to 8.82% per month (30.54% per annum). Among the 13 well-diversified equity funds, the mean varies from −0.25% per month (−2.98% per annum) to 0.94% per month (11.29% per annum), and standard deviation from 3.85% per month (13.33% per annum) to 5.93% per month (20.54% per annum). Although the observation periods for the funds are not exactly the same, they overlap during the majority of the period. (Figure 1 shows a plot of mean return against standard deviation of individual funds.) 2. The Performance 2.1 Performance measures 2.1.1 Jensen measure. Suppose r j,t+1 is the monthly return of the mutual fund, j , in excess of the 1-month risk-free rate, and r m,t+1 is the excess return on the mean-variance efficient market portfolio; The numbers in the table are in annualized monthly returns. The Sharpe measure is a ratio of excess return and the standard deviation. The value-and equal-weighted portfolio of 800 funds, vw800, and ew800, represent all the funds managed by nine investment management companies: Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa, Taiyo, Shin-Wako, Sanyo, Asahi, and Japan. The value-and equal-weighted portfolios of 64 funds, vw64 and ew64, represent a subsample of the 800 funds that were selected based on the criteria that they have more than 97 observations during the observation period. Well-diversified Japanese equity funds invest all or mostly in Japanese stocks with no specialization in particular industries or types of stocks such as growth or low capitalization stocks. The 190 and 13 funds are subsets of the 800 and 64 funds, respectively. The value-weighted index is a portfolio of stocks from both sections of the TSE, all government and corporate bonds with longer than 1-year maturity, and convertible bonds. The buy-and-hold index is an equally weighted portfolio that consists of the 30 largest stocks on the TSE as of December 1980. The bond index consists of all government and corporate bonds with a longer than 1-year maturity and convertible bonds. The maturity of the Gensaki rate is 1 month. The 64 individual funds are selected based on the criteria that they have more than 97 observations during the January 1981-December 1992 period. The portfolios of funds for each management company are equally weighted of all the funds that existed during the observation period. Among all the funds, the well-diversified Japanese equity funds indicated by an asterisk (*) are those that invest all or mostly in Japanese stocks with no specialization in particular industries or types of stocks such as growth or low capitalization stocks. The figures in the parentheses show the number of funds in the portfolio. The indices vw800 and ew800 refer to the value-and equal-weighted portfolios for all 800 mutual funds managed by the nine management companies. Portfolios vw64 and ew64 refer to the value-and equal-weighted portfolios for the 64 funds that had more than 97 observations during the observation period. The well-diversified 190 and 13 funds are subsets of the 800 and 64 funds, respectively. The returns are in percentage rates per month. The names of individual funds are not necessarily the direct translations of the original Japanese names.
Figure 1 Risk and return of Japanese open-type mutual funds
The figure shows the average return and standard deviation of the 64 individual mutual funds selected in Table 2 . All returns and standard deviations are in percentage rates per month.
then the Jensen measure refers to the intercept α j in the following regression:
A positive Jensen measure indicates superior performance if a fund manager possesses stock selection ability but no timing ability.
Positive period weighting measure.
When a fund manager has timing ability, α j can be negative even if the manager is successful both in selecting stocks and gauging market timing. Conversely α j can be positive even if the manager is not successful in both stock selection and timing [see Admati and Ross (1985) , Dybvig and Ross (1985) , Jensen (1972) , and Lehmann and Modest (1987) ]. We therefore calculate the positive period weighting (PPW) measure developed by Titman (1989b, 1994) to address the problem of a negative Jensen measure when a manager has timing information. The PPW measure for fund j is defined as a summation: α j = t w t r j,t , where r j,t is the excess return of the fund for period t, and the summation is over the observation period of the data. The weights are chosen to be nonnegative and satisfy the following relation for the excess return of a benchmark, r m,t , for the same period:
t w t r m,t = 0. This relation corresponds to the first-order condition for holding the optimal benchmark portfolio where the weights correspond to the marginal utility of an investor. To derive these weights we assume a risk-averse investor with a power utility function who maximizes his expected utility (or the average utility over the sample period), t (1/θ)(1 + r f,t + γ r m,t ) θ . The marginal utility at time t is (1+r f,t +γ r m,t ) θ−1 , where the gross return represents the wealth level in each period, assuming the initial wealth is 1. The risk-free rate at time t is denoted by r f,t , and γ is the optimal weight of the benchmark portfolio obtained by maximizing the expected (or the average) utility. The time series of the marginal utilities are rescaled so that they add up to 1; i.e., w t = (1 + r f,t + γ r m,t ) θ−1 / t (1 + r f,t + γ r m,t ) θ−1 . We choose the risk aversion parameter, θ, of −0.68 because the optimal portfolio under this parameter setting requires no holdings of the riskfree asset. We calculate each set of weights for different benchmarks as well as for different observation periods. Ferson and Schadt (1996) recognize the importance of incorporating changing economic conditions in evaluating mutual fund performance. If fund managers shift their portfolios based on public information on economic conditions, traditional (unconditional) performance measures that do not take into account of this effect can be biased. By conditioning on time-varying economic variables, Ferson and Schadt (1996) obtain results that are different from the unconditional analysis. In the conditioned model the beta of a managed portfolio is assumed to be a linear function of public information vector Z t that captures changing economic conditions:
Conditional Jensen measure.
where b 1j is the unconditional mean of the conditional beta
The second coefficient, b 2j , is a beta response coefficient vector that tracks how the beta varies with the innovation of the conditioning variable vector z t = Z t − E (Z t ). By multiplying the market return to β j (Z t ), the following regression is obtained:
Since returns are in terms of excess returns from the risk-free rate, the additional factor in Equation (2) can be interpreted as a self-financing dynamic strategy that purchases z t units of market portfolio by borrowing on the risk-free market.
Benchmark and conditioning variables
Since Japanese stock mutual funds invest not only in stocks but also in bonds as well as convertible bonds, we use the value-weighted benchmark that consists of these assets. [See Section 1.4 and footnote 9 for details of the benchmark.] The conditioning variables are dividend yield of the value-weighted index, 1-month Gensaki rate, term spread between the yield on 10-year government bonds and 1-month Gensaki rate, and finally the January dummy variable. Dividend yield for the market is constructed from the difference between the two market index returns with and without dividends, provided by the PACAP Japanese database. The dividend yield used is computed by summing the monthly dividend for 12 months preceding month t and dividing the sum with the index without dividends for month t. Onemonth Gensaki rates and yields on 10-year government bonds are provided from Daiwa Institute of Research. Table 3 summarizes the Jensen measures based on both unconditional and conditional benchmarks. The results confirm that Japanese open-type mutual funds significantly underperform the market index. The second and third columns of panel A show unconditional and conditional Jensen alphas for the aggregate portfolios. The portfolio alphas of funds in "All category" are consistently negative and statistically significant, with numbers ranging from −0.501% to −0.587% per month (around −6% to −8% per annum). The well-diversified equity funds perform even worse, since their alphas indicate average returns of −8% to −9.5% per annum from the benchmark. Even allowing for transaction costs as high as 3%, the funds still underperform the index on average. The second panel shows summary results for individual funds. Almost all funds have negative alphas, with a majority being statistically significant. In particular, all 13 well-diversified equity funds have negative alphas and 11 of them are statistically significant at the 5% level, regardless of the performance measure. The PPW measures are similar to the Jensen measures in size for the aggregate portfolios. With regard to the individual funds, the results are also comparable to those of the Jensen measures. We examine the alphas of foreign-investment funds to see if they had particularly poor performance due to the appreciation of the yen exchange rate during the observation period. The average alpha of the six foreign-investment funds is −0.425 while that of the domesticonly funds is −0.568. Thus in our sample, whether or not to include foreign-investment funds does not seem to affect the general result.
Performances
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The Jensen measures do not improve with the conditional model. Figure 2 plots the histogram for the unconditional and conditional Jensen measures. Both the unconditional and conditional measures are skewed to the left. The result contrasts with that of Ferson and Schadt (1996) who find that the alphas become more positive when Panel A compares positive period weighting measure as well as the unconditional and conditional Jensen measures from the single-index model for the aggregate mutual fund portfolios. The well-diversified Japanese equity funds invest all or mostly in Japanese stocks with no specialization in particular industries or types of stocks such as growth or low capitalization stocks. These 190 and 13 funds are subsets of the 800 and 64 funds, respectively. The R 2 is the adjusted correlation coefficient and the p-values indicate the significance of the information variables. Heteroskedasticityadjusted t-statistics are in the parentheses. Asterisks (*) indicate significance at the 10% level. Panel B reports the number of the positive, negative, and significantly negative Jensen measures for 64 individual funds and the subset of 13 well-diversified Japanese equity funds under various models. The performances are measured in percentage per month. the conditional model is used. They show that when the covariance between the conditional beta and the excess return on the market portfolio, cov(r m , b 2j z ), is negative, the unconditional Jensen measure is negatively biased.
11 They find this to be the case for U.S. mutual 11 Ferson and Schadt (1996) show that when Equation (2) is the true model, Equation (1) is estimated as
In a different context, Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) suggest that the correlation between the time-varying beta and risk premium gives rise to a biased estimate of the returns earned by the contrarian investment strategy.
Figure 2 Jensen measures: single-factor models
The figure shows the frequency distributions of the Jensen measures of 64 individual funds for both unconditional and conditional single-factor models. See Table 2 for details of the funds.
funds, which explains their result. We do not, however, find significant negative correlation between the conditional betas and the excess market return, which explains why our conditional alphas do not become more positive than the unconditional ones. The conditional variables provide additional information for explaining the return dynamics of the mutual funds. For the aggregate portfolios, the third column of Table 3 panel A reports the p-value of the F -test for the significance of the information variables.
12 Panel A also reports the R 2 s from the two models. The conditional variables provide additional explanatory power of 3% to 4%.
Finally, we note that the survivorship bias should not be a major concern for the 64 funds that are selected for individual analysis for having a relatively long history. Others have noted that the reliance on surviving funds positively skews the performance measure [see Brown et al. (1992) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) ]. In our case, however, the 64 funds show worse performance than the overall industry funds (the 800 portfolios) using any measures presented in this section. Therefore, survivorship bias may not to be a major issue.
Betas
In the first column of Table 4 panel A the beta coefficients from the unconditional model range from 0.835 to 0.958 for the 800 and 64 "All category" portfolios, and from 1.020 to 1.156 for the 190 and 13 "Well-diversified equity" portfolios. The average beta coefficients of the conditional model, b 1 , are shown in the second column of the Panel A reports the estimates for the conditional and unconditional beta for the aggregate mutual fund portfolios from the single-index model. The coefficient β (subscript j omitted) is an unconditional beta from the following regression:
where r j,t+1 is the excess return for the j th fund and r m,t+1 is the excess return on the market portfolio. The coefficient b 1 is the average conditional beta and b 2 is the vector of beta responsive coefficients from the following model:
The vector of information variables, z , includes dividend yield, 1-month Gensaki rate, long-short spread, and the January dummy variable. Therefore
. Heteroskedasticityadjusted t-statistics are in the parenthesis. Asterisks (*) indicate significance at the 10% level. Panel B reports the number of positive, significantly positive, negative, and significantly negative coefficients for the 64 and its subset of 13 individual funds. The significance level is 10%.
table. Conditional betas are larger than the unconditional ones. This implies that the unconditional betas may be biased and that managers could be adjusting their portfolios to changing economic conditions. Particularly, the well-diversified equity funds tend to have betas larger than unity and are larger than the average of all funds. However, the mutual fund industry as a whole, represented by the 800 portfolios, has a risk position that is close to that of the market. Before we look at the sensitivities of the betas to individual conditional variables, we consider whether the same set of information variables can forecast the market returns. We regress the excess returns of the market portfolio 1 month ahead on the information variables of the current month. All information variables are expressed as innovations from the long-term mean. The regression result shows that the dividend yield (div t ) is positively related, and the 1-month Gensaki rate (rg t ) and term spread (sp t ) are negatively related to the excess return on the market portfolio: This implies that these conditioning variables have predictive power for the market returns one period ahead. The negative relation between the spread and market index return from the TSE is also found in Campbell and Hamao (1992) . If managers use this information in adjusting their portfolios, the portfolio betas should respond positively to a change in the dividend yield and negatively to a change in the Gensaki rate and the term spread. The last four columns show the sensitivities of betas to these conditioning variables and the January dummy. The results show that fund managers respond positively to the dividend yield. However, with regard to the interest rate and the term spread, the beta responses are positive, which is opposite to the prediction that managers use this information to forecast the market returns. For individual funds, we observe that the sign for the dividend yield is positive for most of the funds (positive for all well-diversified equity funds), of which about half of them are statistically significant. The signs for the shortterm interest rate and the term spread are again positive for most of the funds, of which about one-half and one-third are significant, respectively. The results from both the aggregate and individual funds suggest that Japanese mutual fund managers responded correctly to dividend yield information but incorrectly to interest rate information. Finally, the signs of the coefficients of January dummies are all negative but not all of the coefficients are statistically significant. Particularly, the coefficients for well-diversified equity funds tend to be less significant.
Subperiod and company analysis
Our observation period, which is from January 1981-December 1992, covers a long bull market until the end of 1989 and the subsequent bear market. We estimate the performance measures for the two subperiods to determine if they differ between the two market environments. The results in Table 5 show that the performance was not any better in either subperiod.
Next we check whether the aggregate performance is affected by a few poorly performing companies. Table 6 shows both conditional Table 5 Basic and unconditional alphas for the nine management companies for the entire observation period as well as for the two subperiods. The table covers only the well-diversified equity funds, since the composition of other types of funds may differ among companies. Also we employ equal-weighted portfolios, instead of the value-weighted ones, to avoid bias that may arise if large funds perform differently from others. The results show that even the best performing company (company A in the table) seems to underperform the index significantly by 5.8% to 5.9% per annum for the entire period. Furthermore, we examine if there is persistence in the performance of the nine management companies. Table 6 includes the ranking of the companies from 1 to 9. We split the observation period according to the previous analysis and estimate the Jensen measures for both unconditional and conditional models. We calculate the Spearman rank correlation between the two periods. The rank correlation of company alphas for the unconditional model is −0.10, and that for the conditional model is 0.00. We conclude that there is little persistence in performance among the companies.
An Investigation of Managers' Strategies
Passive strategies
For comparison with the sample of mutual funds, we construct a number of portfolios based on passive strategies that use known accounting information and no private information about the stocks. The purpose of this exercise is to validate our approach; since passive portfolios are formed without private information, a valid evaluation model should reveal no evidence of stock selection ability if applied to these portfolios. Fama and French (1992) show that two empirically determined variables -size and book-to-market ratio -effectively explain the cross-section of average returns on the U.S. stocks for the period, among other variables like market beta, E/P, and leverage. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) examine cross-sectional regressions for the Japanese stock market and reach similar conclusions. Also in a time-series context, Fama and French (1993) demonstrate that the market factor and the mimicking factors related to size and book-to-market ratio effects successfully capture the common variations in the stock market. Motivated by these results, we construct 36 value-weighted passive portfolios from all stocks listed on the TSE. These include 25 portfolios formed by a two-way sort on size and book-to-market ratios (BE/ME), 6 portfolios formed on the earnings price ratio (E/P), and the 5 portfolios formed on the ratio between book asset and market equity (BA/ME). The first of the six E/P portfolios consists of stocks with negative earnings. The rest of the stocks are broken into five groups, from lowest to highest E/P ratios. Since these 36 portfolios do not use private information, they should generate zero intercepts when regressed on benchmarks and therefore can provide a basis for comparison with the mutual fund performance.
We rebalance the portfolios once a year based on the most currently available information. For most of the Japanese companies, March is the last month of their fiscal year. The annual reports published by the Ministry of Finance become available a few months later. Thus we construct the portfolios in July when new information for most of the companies first becomes available to the public. When calculating the BE/ME, BA/ME, and E/P ratios in July, we use the market values at the end of June and the accounting values from the previous fiscal year that ends anytime between April of the previous year and March of the current year.
We regress the excess returns of the 36 passive portfolios on the excess returns of the market portfolio. The first panel of Table 7 reports the intercepts from the unconditional model. Most of the significant and positive intercepts are from the portfolios of smaller size and higher BE/ME ratios, and a significantly negative alpha is observed for the portfolio with the largest size and the lowest BE/ME ratio. This evidence implies the inefficiency of the value-weighted market portfolio; that is, one can buy small stocks with high BE/ME ratios to beat the performance of the value-weighted portfolio. The second panel of Table 7 summarizes the results for the conditional model which are similar to those from the unconditional regression. 
Three-factor model
Based on the findings above, we investigate if underperformance of Japanese open-type mutual funds stems from investing in large and low BE/ME ratio stocks. To this end we construct factors that represent the two factors described above. First, we construct passive portfolios based on size and BE/ME ratios as explained in the previous section. For size-based groups, we use the median to split the stocks into the big and small groups (B and S). For the BE/ME ratios, we group the stocks based on breakpoints for the bottom 30% (low), the middle 40% (medium), and the top 30% (high) ratios. Therefore, we have six portfolios; that is, small-and large-firm portfolios each classified into low, medium, and high BE/ME ratios. We use the notation SL, SM, and SH for small-firm portfolios with three different levels of BE/ME ratios, and BL, BM, and BH for the three large-firm portfolios. After forming the portfolios, we calculate monthly value-weighted returns by using the same weights from July of the current year to June of the following year. Next we calculate the returns of two self-financing portfolios; one related to size and the other to the BE/ME ratio. The return of the mimicking portfolio that is related to size, SMB, is the difference between the average return of the three small-stock portfolios (SL, SM, SH) and the average return of the three large-stock portfolios (BL, BM, BH). The return of the mimicking portfolio should be free of the influence of the BE/ME ratio effect and should characterize the return difference between large and small stocks. Similarly, the return of the mimicking portfolio that is related to the BE/ME ratio, HML, is the difference between the average return of the two high BE/ME ratio portfolios (SH and BH) and that of the two low BE/ME ratio portfolios (SL and BL). The return of the HML portfolio should be free of the influence of size and should capture the difference in returns of the high and low BE/ME ratio stocks. The correlation between the two factors, SMB and HML, is small (−0.04).
In the next step we regress the excess returns of the various passive portfolios that we constructed in Section 3.1 on the three factors. Most Table 7 Passive strategy portfolios Panel A: Unconditional BE/ME 1 BE/ME 2 BE/ME 3 BE/ME 4 BE/ME The numbers are intercepts (Jensen measures) of the regressions of 36 passive portfolio excess returns on the value-weighted market index that includes stocks, bonds with longer than 1-year maturity, and convertible bonds. The numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics. Among the 36 portfolios, 25 are sorted by size and book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), 6 by earning price ratio (E/P), and 5 by book asset/market equity ratio (BA/ME), formed from all stocks in both the first and second sections of the TSE. The excess returns are net of the 1-month Gensaki rates. Size 1 (5) has the smallest (largest) market capitalization, BE/ME 1 (5) has the lowest (highest) BE/ME ratio. E/P 1 (5) has the lowest (highest) E/P ratio and BA/ME 1 (5) has the lowest (highest) leverage. Asterisks (*) indicate significance at 10%.
of these passive portfolios do not generate abnormal performance with respect to the three-factor benchmark (not reported). This result implies that the three factors can mimic an efficient benchmark. Similar results have been found by Fama and French (1993) for the U.S. stock market. The explanatory power of the three factors against the passive 25 size and BE/ME ratio sorted portfolio returns are 0.811 on average. The adjusted R 2 s are relatively low compared to those results found by Fama and French (1993) . The reason is that our market index, or the first factor, includes bonds. When we use the stock index (TOPIX) for the first factor, the average R 2 increases to 0.912, which is comparable to the Fama and French (1993) results. Therefore the size and BE/ME ratio factors are reasonable factors for explaining the equity portion of the mutual fund returns.
Our primary interest is to find whether the underperformance is due to the inefficiency of the single-factor benchmark; that is, whether using a more efficient benchmark mitigates the possible bias in the estimate of the Jensen measure. The unconditional three-factor model refers to the following equation:
where β, β SMB , and β HML are unconditional betas for the market factor, the size factor, and the BE/ME ratio, respectively. Alternately, the conditional three-factor model refers to the following equation: are vectors of beta-responsive coefficients with respect to the factors. The vector of information variables, z t , includes dividend yield, 1-month Gensaki rate, the term spread, and the January dummy. The Jensen measures are intercepts of the equations. In Table 8 the estimated numbers under columns α and a still indicate underperformance, and their magnitudes are close to the estimates from the single-factor models. Panel B of Table 8 and Figure 3 show the Jensen measures of the individual funds. Although the results are similar between the two models, the conditional model shows slightly more significant negative alphas than the unconditional model.
14 In sum, the inclusion of size and book-to-market factors do not affect the underperformance of the funds.
Although the underperformance is not explained, the coefficients on the factors provide interesting information about how managers formed their portfolios. The mimicking factor SMB measures the difference in returns between small and large stock portfolios. A positive (negative) coefficient on the SMB factor indicates that the underlying Table 8 Three-factor models, January 1981-December 1992 
Unconditional
where r j,t+1 is the excess return for the j th mutual fund, r m,t+1 is the excess return of the value-weighted market portfolio, SMB 
The vector of information variables, z , includes dividend yield, 1-month Gensaki rate, the long-short spread, and the January dummy. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in the parentheses. Asterisks (*) indicate significance at the 10% level. Panel B reports the number of positive and negative coefficients from the 64 and its subset of 13 individual funds. The significance level is 10%.
Figure 3 Jensen measures: three-factor models
The figure shows the frequency distributions of Jensen measures of 64 individual funds for both unconditional and conditional three-factor models. See Table 2 for details of the funds.
fund is tilted toward smaller (larger) stocks relative to the market index. From panel A of Table 8 , the SMB slopes for the eight mutual fund portfolios are all negative and the t-statistics exceed 2, except for the ew800, vw190, and ew190 portfolios using the unconditional model. For the conditional model, the coefficients are all significant. For the individual funds we find that about one-third of the estimates are significantly negative among the 64 funds, and most of them are both negative and significant for the 13 well-diversified equity funds. The mimicking factor HML measures the difference in returns between portfolio of stocks with high and low BE/ME ratios. Again, a negative coefficient on the HML factor indicates that the underlying fund is tilted toward low BE/ME ratio stocks relative to the market index. The slopes of the HML factor are all negative for the aggregate portfolios. Although the coefficients are not significant for the 800 portfolios with the unconditional model, they are all significant with the conditional model. For the 64 individual funds, only half of them have negative slopes for the unconditional model, and most of them are not statistically significant. However, for the conditional model, most of them are negative and more than half of them are significant. In particular, for the 13 well-diversified equity funds, all of them have negative signs and most of them are statistically significant.
We can conclude that for most Japanese mutual funds, the average conditional betas for both SML and HML factors are negative. In other words, Japanese mutual fund managers lean towards stocks with large market capitalization and low BE/ME ratios, or large and glamour stocks. However, our results show such strategies are not the main source of underperformance. 15 In a recent article Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) showed that those investment strategies that buy out-of-favor or value stocks (for example, stocks with high BE/ME ratios) have outperformed glamour strategies over the period in the United States. They conjecture that the results can be best explained by the preference of both institutional and individual investors for glamour stocks and by their avoidance of value stocks. Particularly institutions might prefer glamour stocks because they appear to be prudent to investors. The results for Japanese mutual funds are consistent with this conjecture. In addition, managers of open-type mutual funds may tend to hold glamour stocks because they are likely to be more liquid and the funds are exposed to repurchase from the investors. 
Timing and selectivity
Timing refers to a manager's ability to tilt his portfolio to a greater portion of the market portfolio when market return is higher and vice versa. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) capture such a nonlinear relation by a squared term of the return on the market portfolio. Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the analysis to a conditional setting. Our results (not reported) show negative timing coefficients that are statistically significant for both unconditional and conditional single-index models. As a result, Jensen's alphas shift in a positive direction, for example, by 0.175% per month (2.1% per annum) for the vw800 portfolio and 0.207% (2.5% per annum) for the ew800 portfolio, relative to the alphas of the model without the timing coefficient. Therefore it seems that part of negative alphas is explained by negative timing.
To assess the validity of the model, we apply the model to the 36 passive portfolios. We find that most of the timing coefficients are negative; particularly portfolios with large-size and low BE/ME ratio stocks tend to have significant coefficients while the others do not. The alphas of these passive portfolios become uniformly higher, say by 0.2% to 0.3% per month, compared to the models without the timing coefficient. Therefore we cannot conclude that the mutual funds' significant timing coefficients and less negative alphas are due 15 In order to form the passive portfolios, accounting information was obtained from the PACAP Japanese tape, which has a forward-looking bias; that is, the delisted firms are excluded from the data whenever the tape is newly compiled. See Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) for similar comments on Japanese data. The observation period for this study is 12 years from January 1981-December 1992, and 53 companies were delisted during the period among 1,412 companies in 1981 and 1,651 in 1992. The majority of these companies were delisted either due to mergers and/or financial distress. Since the number of delisted companies seems to be relatively small, the bias may not be significant for our study. 16 From personal conversation with those in the management companies.
to negative timing. Instead, this result may be simply due to the fact that funds hold large and low BE/ME ratio stocks. Similar results hold for the conditional model as well. 17 As pointed out by Admati, et al. (1986) , it is difficult to separate timing from selective activities. Further, it is possible to construct portfolios that show artificial timing ability when no true timing exists. In practice, investing in options or option-like securities will generate spurious timing. [See Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) and Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) for a detailed discussion.]
The Dilution Effect of Fund Inflows
To explain the dilution effect, we show how capital gains tax is determined for open-type mutual funds.
18 When an investor sells an existing share of funds, the after-tax price (P ) is net asset value (NAV) minus capital gains tax; P = NAV − Tax. (Note that the mutual fund returns that we used are calculated from NAV .) In the case of opentype mutual funds, the government defines a fund's capital gain as the difference between the current NAV and the historical trade-weighted average of the after-tax price (P ) since the start of the fund; that is, the capital gain is max[NAV −P , 0] whereP is the average price since the fund's inception. 19 The government is able to collect taxes without keeping track of the individual transactions of investors as long as the capital gain is defined in this manner. Thus the capital gain of an open-type mutual fund is calculated for each fund at each point in time, not for each investor's transactions.
The NAV per share may be diluted when a new investor buys shares of an existing fund. Dilution occurs when the price that an investor pays for a share is less than the existing NAV per share. This is the case for open-type funds because a new investor is only required to pay the after-tax NAV (i.e., P ), not the NAV. Only when there is no capital gain is the after-tax price equal to the NAV per share. Thus when there is any capital gain in the fund, inflow causes dilution. In 17 We also considered the timing ability using the Merton and Henriksson (1981) model, which models the manager's timing behavior as creating an option-like payoff. Tests involving the passive portfolios show spurious timing ability with this model, thus we did not carry out the analysis of this model on the mutual fund sample. 18 The authors thank the following for having drawn our attention to this fact and clarifying our questions: Katsuhide Hatanaka with LTCB Investment Advisory Co., Mamoru Mochizuki, Osamu Shigeta, Hiroshi Tunoi, Koichi Watanabe, all with Daiwa Investment Trust, and Toshinori Takayama with MTB Investment Technology. During the revision of our article we came across Ueda (1994) which also points out the dilution effect. 19 Capital loss is not recognized in this rule.
the case of an outflow, the fund pays out NAV to an investor so that the NAV per share remains the same after the transaction.
The dilution effect can be formulated as follows: Let n be the number of existing mutual fund shares, a be the number of newly issued shares, and d be the number of repurchased shares by the fund. The value of NAV after the transactions is denoted by a prime, and the after-tax value by P as defined above. When an investor withdraws money from the fund, the fund pays out the NAV and the investor pays the capital gains tax, if any, from the proceeds; while a new investor pays in only P . Therefore we have NAV = (nNAV
. If the return on the managed portfolio is r during the period, then we have NAV = NAV (1 + r ) − αTax where the last term shows the dilution effect. The capital gains tax is calculated using the following formula:
, where the tax rate is 20%. 20 A single period expected return of the NAV, E(NAV )/NAV − 1, is
where E is the expectation operator and the second term is the dilution effect. Given the expected performance of the managed portfolio, E(r ), the dilution effect is expected to be larger if (1) the rate of future inflow of funds (α) is larger and (2) currentP /NAV is lower. The dilution effect penetrates into subsequent periods since the current transaction price, P , is incorporated in the average transaction price, P , in the following period. The ratio between this new average transaction price and the NAV in the next period is used to determine the capital gain in the next transaction. Due to this multiperiod effect, the dilution effect is larger if (3) there have been more transactions since the fund started. Thus older funds have more dilution effect, other things being equal. This is true because the movement ofP becomes more smooth and less responsive to the current movement of the NAV. Therefore there is higher probability that future NAV is larger than futureP , thus a higher probability of dilution.
Since information on α andP for individual funds is not available, we conduct a bootstrap experiment using the actual distribution of the single-factor benchmark index. Although the fund inflow rate is 20 The tax is levied separately at the source. Tax-exempt investors include, for example, individual investors over 65 years old. If a corporation holds a stock mutual fund, the 20% tax levied on both dividends and capital gains is deductible from corporate tax in proportion to the holding period of the fund. Also 40% of both dividends and capital gains is not considered as corporate earnings and thus not subject to corporate tax. Nonresident investors, in principle, are taxed at the same rate as Japanese investors. However, if a country has a tax treaty with the Japanese government, the tax rate is determined by the treaty. The rate applied for many countries, including the United States, in such cases is 15%.
a stochastic variable, we treat it as a nonstochastic parameter in the simulation. We provide results for different inflow rates. We assume that a fund manager invests in an index portfolio that is equal to the single-factor benchmark that we used in the previous sections. Thus the portfolio returns are drawn from the distribution of the benchmark returns from January 1981-December 1992. The experiment is repeated 1,000 times for each set of parameters. Table 9 panel A shows the mean and standard deviation of the dilution effect from 1,000 replications for various cases. The numbers are in terms of percentages per month. From the same set of experiments, panel B reports the probability that the dilution effect explains the underperformance of −0.6% per month, which is a ballpark figure of the underperformance of the aggregate mutual fund portfolios. We have no information about the initial difference between NAV andP at the starting point of the simulation (i.e., January 1981). Therefore we present three cases: where NAV is higher thanP by 10%, is at the same level asP , and is lower thanP by 10%. We know that the average aggregate inflow rate during the observation period is around 0.1 (10%) per month [Investment Trusts Association (1994) ]. 21 However, the aggregate inflow includes new mutual funds that started during the observation period. It is the inflow to an existing fund that is relevant to the dilution effect. Thus the inflow that causes dilution should be smaller than that implied by the aggregate inflow rate. Therefore we also provide results that assume smaller inflow rates. The age of the fund at the beginning of the simulation is set equal to 10 years. For example, among the 64 funds, 28 funds existed in January 1981, and the average age was 13.3 years. The effective age of the index of both 64 and 800 funds should be much younger because many of the funds started operation after 1983. Panel A shows that, with the inflow rate of 0.1, the average dilution effect is between 0.336% and 0.424% per month. Panel B shows that, at this inflow rate, the dilution effect explains the underperformance with probability zero. But it can explain half of the underperformance (−3%) with probability of more than 50%. At a smaller but perhaps more reasonable inflow rate of 0.05 per month, the average dilution effect drops to between 0.211% and 0.271% per month, and the probability that it can explain even half the underperformance drops to less than 30%.
However, we must be very careful in interpreting these figures because they are based on hypothetical simulations whose assumptions The first column, NAV 0 /P 0 , is the premium (or discount) of the current NAV over the past average of after-tax prices of the mutual fund share. This is the initial premium (or discount) set at the beginning of the simulated series of 144 months. The fund inflow rate (α) is the ratio of inflow per month to the total assets outstanding. The initial age of the fund is set equal to 10 years (or 120 months). One plus the rate of return of NAV is calculated using the following formula for month t:
where r t is the rate of return of the managed portfolio, andP t = {P t−1 × (120 + t − 1) + P t }/(120 + t) where may differ from the situations of individual funds. 22 One piece of information suggests that the dilution effect may be less than these simulations suggest. We compare the returns on the two portfolios, ew64 and ew800, noting that the average dilution effect could be less for the latter after the mid-1980s, because the latter includes many new funds that started after that period, and those funds should be less diluted than the older ones. We compare the subperiod return of both ew64 and ew800 funds; where the returns are 8.70% per annum and 8.41% per annum for [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , and are −3.50% per annum and −3.76% per annum for 1987-1992, respectively. We do not find the ew64 return to be less than the ew800 return.
There is a fund selection strategy that allows investors of opentype funds to take advantage of this institutional setting. Recall that an investor only pays the after-tax (or traded) price, P = NAV − Tax, on buying a share, and receives P on selling. Therefore the rate of return for an investor is calculated from P (not NAV ). An anecdotal example is that an investor can select a fund whose NAV is deep below P , since the probability of future NAV being less thanP is higher in this case than otherwise. An investor can benefit from two sources if NAV is less thanP in the future. 23 First, the NAV directly reflects the performance of managers since there is no dilution effect. Second, an investor need not pay capital gains tax on selling the share. On the other hand, if an investor buys a share in a fund whose NAV is aboveP , he/she benefits by paying less than the existing NAV since an investor pays the after-tax price, P = NAV − Tax with Tax > 0, today. Using the same experiments as above, we calculate the difference in returns (on P ) between a strategy of buying a fund whose NAV is belowP by 10% and that of buying a fund whose NAV is aboveP by 10%. The result shows that buying funds whose NAV is belowP yields on average 0.91% per annum more than buying funds whose NAV is aboveP . 24 In sum, the advantages of both avoiding dilution and not paying capital gains tax in the future outweigh the advantage of paying less than NAV for diluted funds today.
Next we compare the after-tax return of an investor holding an index mutual fund with that of an investor holding an index portfolio. We use the result from one of the simulations in which the inflow rate (α) is equal to 0.05 and NAV 0 /P 0 = 1. We find that the simulated after-tax return for the investor (i.e., the rate of return of the traded price, P ) is 5.10% per annum on average when the performance of the underlying index is 8.90% per annum, thus 3.80% per annum below the index return. 25 On the other hand, an investor who directly invests in an index portfolio must pay capital gains tax. Thus the after-tax return depends on the rate of capital gains tax levied on the investor. Before April 1989 capital gains tax was levied on investors who made intensive trading of more than 30 transactions involving more than a total of 120 thousand shares per year. 26 Then the income tax rate of the investor was applied to the capital gains. Using the after-tax return on the mutual fund (5.10% per annum) and the index return (8.90% per annum), we calculate a break-even capital gains tax, which is 42.7% (= 100 × {1 − 5.10/8.90}). If an investor's capital gains tax is lower than this rate, the after-tax return from directly investing in the index portfolio is higher than that from investing in an index mutual fund. As a matter of fact, no capital gains tax was levied before April 1989 on normal levels of equity trading, and the capital gains tax rate has been only 26% since April 1989. The break-even tax rate is so high that it may not be difficult for many investors to find an investment strategy, say a buy-and-hold one, that yields higher after-tax returns than that of a mutual fund.
Conclusions and Implications
In this article we investigate the performance of Japanese open-type equity mutual funds. We find that over the January 1981-December 1992 period, the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios of the 800 mutual funds run by the nine management companies underperform the single-index benchmark by approximately 7.0% and 6.0%, respectively. The subset of funds that invest mainly in domestic equity performed even worse. The poor performance was pervasive among the different companies examined, and was found in bull as well as bear markets.
Our results are robust to the methodology used as well as the benchmark portfolios used. We consider the possibility that managers tilted their portfolios toward large and glamour firms relative to the single-market index, thus using a single-index benchmark may result in spurious underperformance measures. Although we find fund managers tilt toward stocks that have larger market capitalization and low BE/ME ratios, or large and glamour stocks, the funds still underperform by the same magnitude as before, relative to portfolios that passively follow the strategy of buying large and glamour stocks. 26 Capital gains tax was also imposed on trading involving more than 120 thousand shares per year of a single company. Otherwise no tax was levied on capital gains on equities. After April 1989 an investor can choose between a 26% tax (20% national tax, 6% local inhabitants' tax) on capital gains and a 20% tax imposed on 5% of the equity sales price [see Ishi (1994), pp. 143-144] .
We finally are left with explanations related to institutional features of the mutual fund industry: the excessive turnover, transaction expenses, or the dilution effect from fund inflows that is caused by the difference between the NAV and the share prices based on after-tax value. That the compensation of the fund manager is usually not directly linked to the funds' performance and that, on the aggregate, the funds have higher turnover than the market lend some credibility to this. Based on bootstrap experiments, we find that the dilution effect, under a set of assumptions that yield the maximum effect, explains 3% per annum of the underperformance with a probability of 50%. However, a comparison between the performance of funds that existed from the beginning of our sample period and those that started later shows that there is not significant difference between their performance, which suggests that the dilution effect may not be serious. Without direct data on turnover, fund composition, and fund inflow, the dilution explanation is at best a conjecture. 27 Besides the dilution effect, fixed management fee accounts for about 1% per annum, and the brokerage commission and securities transfer tax is estimated at around 0.7% to 1.3% per annum, with 110% turnover rate. Therefore, approximately 5% per annum of the underperformance may be attributed to these factors including the dilution effect. Since the underperformance is about 9.5% per annum for the welldiversified domestic equity funds, approximately 4.5% per annum of the underperformance remains unexplained. The results reported in this article have raised some serious questions concerning the performance of Japanese mutual funds that need to be addressed in future research.
